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1. Introduction
In the classical Black-Scholes model and in fact in most other continuous
time financial market models it is assumed that agents behavior does not
influence asset-prices and all agents possess the same level of information.
These models have been very successfully applied to classical questions such
as the pricing of options and derivatives as well as optimal asset alloca-
tion. However these models are not suitable to explain how the level of
information influences the general performance of the stock market or how
and for what price information may be exchanged between individual agents
on the market. There is no doubt about that in real world markets agents
possess different levels of information and that it is important to understand
what value particular pieces of information have and how general welfare
is affected by these. In the first part of this article, we set up a continuous
time market model in which agents are assumed to influence asset-prices
and are exposed to different information flows. The framework is the one
of a stochastic differential game with anticipative strategy sets. We derive
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash-equilibria for
this game and characterize these for various levels of information asymmetry.
Furthermore we study the consequences, an increased level of information
has on general welfare. Information asymmetry is not a contradiction to the
efficient market hypotheses, as the agents may indeed learn all the necessary
information by carefully studying the market, if they invest enough effort to
do so. However the emphasize here lies on effort. Different agents invest
different amounts of effort or capital in order to obtain information, that
may enable them to trade more successfully. Information is costly, and in
the second part of this article we study the aspect of pricing information
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within a competetive market. To illustrate this, let us consider the following
three scenarios. In scenario 1 a private investors may start buying stocks
or funds without knowing anything about the market and not intending to
learn anything about it, simply because he has read an advertisement in his
local bank. In scenario 2 a private investor is strongly engaged in monitoring
his individual portfolio, buying financial newspapers, investing time to watch
business channels etc. Finally, in scenario 3, a big company who represents
a significant market player may invest large sums in hiring a consulting
company, which essentially provides it with key information on the market.
All three scenarios present different aspects under which information may
be traded between market players. In the first scenario the exchange of
information is costless for the investor while the bank bears costs due to the
advertisement campaign. Obviously there is a matter of trust here, but we
leave this issue aside. In scenario 2 the investor invests money and time
to obtain information on the market, essentially to trade more successfully
and outperform other market participants. The exchange of information in
this case is costly for the private investor, while the seller of information, i.e.
financial press, media, but also financial institutions, which often provides
media with important information on their business strategies, gain from
this sale. The situation in the third scenario is very similar as in the second
one, as long as the investor is concerned. Here again, the investor invests to
obtain information from the consulting company, the exchange of information
is costly. There is a significant difference in this scenario however, and this
reflects the point of view of the seller of information. While in the second ex-
ample the private investor is assumed to be a price taker and has no influence
on market prices, a major company which owns large portfolios represents
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a trader, which has market impact and may influence market prices due
to the mechanisms of supply and demand. The consulting company, which
is also engaged on the market, must bear in mind the consequences that
giving information to a large trader may change prices and therefore affect
the value of their own portfolios, when considering whether or not and for
which price to sell information. The first example more or less represents a
problem in finding the right advertisement strategy for the bank and can be
addressed in the general context of advertisement. A situation as described
in scenario 2 has been addressed in continuous time diffusion-type market
models, complete and incomplete, by various authors, for example Karatzas
and Pikovsky (1996), Corcuera (2004), Imkeller (2003), Leon et al. (2003)
and Ewald (2005). In this context the value of additional information is
determined from the point of view of a representative uninformed agent. This
agent would buy the information for any price P such that
u(x, πˆ∗) ≤ u(x− P, π∗)
where π∗ and πˆ∗ denote the optimal portfolios under additional resp. no
additional information. Here u denotes expected utility from terminal wealth
while x resp. x − P denote the different levels of initial wealth. The owner
of the information would sell for any price, as he does not fear for any con-
sequences on the market. Any positive price offer for the information would
give an incentive to sell, and in the presence of many possible information
providers bring the sellers-price down to zero. In the third example, and
this is the situation on which we focus in this article, the situations is more
complex, as the seller of the information must take the buyers market impact
into account. Selling information comes with the risk that the buyer may use
the information in a way, that market prices change to the disadvantage of
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the seller. This situation has not been studied before in a continuous time
diffusion-type financial market model. The framework we consider is most
general. We study a market model in which two agents use information flows
modeled by filtrations G1 and G2 in order to buy or sell assets, whose prices
they may influence depending on their current position in the market. These
filtrations are assumed to satisfy the usual conditions, see Karatzas-Schreve
(1988) page 10. The technical framework of the second part of this article
is an extension of the market game studied in the first part, including two
initial stages in which information can be traded for monetary units. We solve
for the Nash-equilibria of this game and in this way determine competitive
prices for the pieces of information sold. In both cases, extended and original
market game, agents face continuous time investment decisions. Trading
strategies need to be integrated with respect to price processes in order to
compute returns. In diffusion type models integration with respect to price
processes is essentially the same as integration with respect to Brownian
motion. The standard stochastic integral, which is the Itoˆ-integral, does not
allow the integrand to depend on more information than revealed by the
Brownian motion itself. In our framework, where agents have asymmetric
information, which may exceed the level of information revealed by the un-
derlying Brownian motion, the Itoˆ integral is to restrictive. In order to avoid
these problems we use an anticipative stochastic calculus which has been
developed in the last two decades. We use the technical framework based on
the forward integral as found in Kohatsu-Higa and Sulem (2006). In order
to provide analytically tractable examples we also make use of the classical
technique of enlargement of filtration, developed originally by Jacod (1985)
which is nowadays used throughout the literature.
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The paper is organized as follows. We give a short introduction on anticipa-
tive stochastic calculus in section 2 while in section 3 we set up our market
model and compute Nash-equilibrium strategies. In this section we also study
the question, how these equilibria change with respect to changes in the
information level and how general welfare is affected by this. In section 4
we extend the game with a pre-stage in which information may be exchanged
in return for monetary units and determine equilibrium prices for the infor-
mation. Section 5 contains the main conclusions from the paper.
2. A brief review of anticipative stochastic calculus
In this section we introduce some preliminaries about the anticipative stochas-
tic calculus, which in fact is strongly related to what is called the Malliavin
calculus. A standard reference for this is Nualart (1995). Let us consider the
set S of cylindrical functionals F : Ω → R, given by F = f (W(t1), ...,W(tl))
where f ∈ C∞b
(
(Rn)l
)
is a smooth function with bounded derivatives of all
orders and (W(t)) denotes an n-dimensional Brownian motion on Ω. We define
the Malliavin derivative operator on S via
DsF :=
l∑
i=1
∂f
∂xi
(Wt1(ω), ...,Wtl(ω)) · 1[0,ti](s),
were ∂f
∂xi
denotes the gradient of f with respect to its i-th n-dimensional
argument. This operator and the iterated operators Dk are closable and
unbounded from Lp (Ω) into Lp
(
Ω× [0, T ]k,Rn
)
, for all k ≥ 1. Their respective
domains are denoted by Dk,p and obtained as the closure of S with respect to
the norms defined by ‖F‖pk,p = ‖F‖
p
Lp(Ω)+
∑k
j=1 ‖D
jF‖
p
Lp(Ω×[0,T ]j ,Rn)
. The adjoint
of the Malliavin derivative operator D : D1,2 → L2(Ω × [0, T ],Rn) is called the
Skorohod integral and denoted with δ. This operator has the property that
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its domain contains the class L2a(Ω × [0, T ],R
n) of square integrable adapted
stochastic processes and its restriction to this class coincides with the Itoˆ-
integral. We will make use of the notation δ(u) =
∫ T
0
utdWt. Malliavin deriva-
tive operator and Skorohod integral are related by the following integration
by parts formula
E (δ(u)F ) = E


T∫
0
DtF · u(t)dt

 , for any F ∈ D1,2. (1)
The following proposition is used to calculate the logarithmic derivative, often
called information drift in information theory. It will prove particularly useful
in our examples in the next section. The result is well known in the case
where the underlying process X is a Brownian motion. Even though this is
precisely the case which we refer to in our application ,we include a more
general result here, where X is assumed to be general time-homogeneous
diffusion. This proves to be useful in the framework of stochastic volatility
models, where additional information is determined by the level of volatility
in the future, see for example Ewald (2005) .
Proposition 1. Suppose thatX = X(T0), T0 ≥ T whereX solves the stochastic
differential equation
dX(t) = b(X(t))dt+ σ(X(t))dW(t).
whereW(t) is a 1-dim Brownianmotion. We assume that the transition density
p(t, u, x, y) is two times continuously differentiable with respect to x and one
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time continuously differentiable with respect to t.∗ Then
W˜(t) = W(t)−
t∫
0
σ(X(u))∂x log(p(u, T0, X(u), X(T0)))du
is a Brownian motion w.r.t. G = (Gt) with Gt = Ft ∨ σ(X(T0)) for t ≤ T .
Proof. Let f be a smooth function andM be anFs-adapted random variable.
E((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))) = E (E((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))|Ft))
= E
(
(W(t)−W(s))M
∫
f(y)p(t, T0, X(t), y)dy
)
= E
(
δ(1(s,t](u))M
∫
f(y)p(t, T0, X(t), y)dy
)
= E
(∫ t
s
Du
(
M
∫
f(y)p(t, T0, X(t), y)dy
)
du
)
.
Because M is adapted to Fs, we haveDuM = 0 for u > s. Applying first the
product rule to to M
∫
f(y)p(u, T0, X(u), y)dy) and then Fubini’s theorem we
obtain
E((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))) = E
(∫ t
s
M
∫
f(y)Dup(t, T0, X(t), y)dydu
)
= E
(∫
f(y)M
∫ t
s
Dup(t, T0, X(t), y)dudy
)
.
It follows from the Itoˆ formula that
Dup(t, T0, X(t), y) = Du
{
p(s,X(s), y) +
∫ t
s
[
∂p(v, T0, X(v), y)
∂v
+b(X(v))
∂p(v, T0, X(v), y)
∂x
+
1
2
σ2(X(v))
∂2p(v, T0, X(v), y)
∂x2
]
dv
+
∫ t
s
σ(X(v))
∂p(v, T0, X(v), y)
∂x
dW(v)dudy
}
.
∗ Condition for this in terms of the Malliavin derivative are given in Theorem 2.1.4 and
Corollary 2.1.2 in Nualart (1995)
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From the Kolmogorov backward equation we can conclude that the expression
in the square brackets is zero. Furthermore Dup(s,X(s), y) = 0 for the reason
that u ≥ s implies that p(s,X(s), y) is Fu adapted. We therefore obtain that
E((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))) is given by the expression
E

∫ f(y)M
t∫
s
Du
[∫ t
s
σ(X(v))
∂p(v, T0, X(v), y)
∂x
dW(v)
]
dudy


Applying the Malliavin derivative operator on the expression in the square
brackets leads according to Nualart (1995) Lemma 1.3.4 to
E ((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))) = E
(∫
f(y)M
∫ t
s
(
σ(X(u))
∂p(u, T0, X(u), y)
∂x
+
∫ t
u
Du
[
σ(X(v))
∂p(v, T0, X(v), y)
∂x
]
dW(v)
)
dudy
)
Using the Fubini theorem to interchange the order of integration and taking
expectations inside the integral and furthermore realizing that the expecta-
tion of an Itoˆ integral with respect to Brownian motion is always zero, we
obtain that
E ((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))) = E

∫ f(y)M
t∫
s
σ(X(u))
∂p(u, T0, X(u), y)
∂x
dudy


Another application of Fubini’s theorem and the fact that for a positive differ-
entiable function α(x) we have ∂ log(α(x))
∂x
· α(x) = ∂α(x)
∂x
leads us to
E ((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))) = E
(∫ t
s
(∫
f(y)Mσ(X(u))
∂ log p(u, T0, X(u), y)
∂x
×p(u, T0, X(u), y)dy) du)
By definition of the transition density function we conclude that
E ((W(t)−W(s))Mf(X(T0))) = E

f(X(T0))M
t∫
s
σ(X(u))
∂ log p(u, T0, X(u), X(T0))
∂x
du


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A density argument then establishes that
E

W(t)−W(s)−
t∫
s
σ(X(u))
∂ log p(u, T0, X(u), X(T0))
∂x
du
∣∣∣∣∣∣Gs

 = 0 (2)
Now, by definition of W˜(t) the last equality is equivalent to
E(W˜(t)− W˜(s)|Gs) = 0
and
(
W˜(t)
)
[0,T ]
is therefore a continuous martingale with respect to the filtra-
tion G. Its quadratic variation is given by < W˜(t) >= t for t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence,
by Le´vy’s theorem we have that
(
W˜(t)
)
[0,T ]
is a Brownian motion w.r.t. Gt.
Example 1. Assume that Xi(T0) = Wi(T0), i = 1, . . . , n such that Gt = Ft ∨
σ(X1(T0)) ∨ · · · ∨ σ(Xn(T0)). We can then explicitly write down the transition
probability density of Xi(T0) conditional on Ft
p(t, T0, Xi(t), y) =
1√
2π(T0 − t)
exp
(
−
(y −Xi(t))
2
2(T0 − t)
)
.
Then
σ(Xi(u))∂x log(p(u, T0, Xi(u), X(T0)) =
Xi(T0)−Xi(u)
T0 − u
=
Wi(T0)−Wi(u)
T0 − u
,
and W˜i(t) = Wi(t)−
t∫
0
Wi(T0)−Wi(u)
T0−u
du is a G-Brownian motion, noticing E(Xi(t)−
Xi(s)|Gs) = E(Xi(t)−Xi(s)|Fs ∨ σ(Xi(s))).
In the following section we will use the so called forward integral which allows
us more flexibility in the choice of stochastic integrands. For details see for
example Russo and Valois (1993).
Definition 1. Let ϕ : [0, T ] × Ω → Rn be a measurable process. The forward
integral of ϕ with respect to W(t) is defined by
T∫
0
ϕ(t) · d−W(t) = lim
ǫ→0
T∫
0
ϕ⊤(t) ·
W(t+ ǫ)−W(t)
ǫ
dt, (3)
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if the limit exists in probability.
The forward integral is related to the Skorohod integral in the following
way. Suppose that ϕ is Rn-valued as in Definition 1 with ϕ ∈ D1,2 satisfying
E


T∫
0
|ϕ(t)|2

 dt+ E


T∫
0
T∫
0
‖Dsϕ(t)‖
2

 dsdt ≤ ∞
where ‖·‖ denotes the euclideanmatrix norm. Moreover, assume that Tr(Dt+ϕ(t))
:= lim
s→t+
Tr(Dsϕ(t)) exists in L
2([0, T ]× Ω). Then ϕ is forward integrable and
T∫
0
ϕ(t) · d−W(t) = δ(ϕ(t)) +
T∫
0
Tr(Dt+ϕ(t)dt. (4)
A proof of this result can be found for example Russo and Valois (1993) or
Kohatsu-Higa and Sulem (2006). Taking into account that the expectation of
a Skorohod integral always vanishes, we obtain
E


T∫
0
ϕ(t) · d−W(t)

 = E


T∫
0
Tr(Dt+ϕ(t)dt

 . (5)
Furthermore it can be shown that if ϕ is forward integrable and ca`gla`d (i.e.
left continuous with left limits) and ∆ := {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T} is a
sequence of partitions such that ∆n := sup
i=0,··· ,n−1
{ti+1 − ti} goes to zero when
n→∞, then
T∫
0
ϕ(t) · d−W(t) = lim
∆n→0
n−1∑
i=0
ϕ⊤(ti) · (W(ti+1)−W(ti)) (6)
if the limit exists in probability. Taken the latter into account one can indeed
argue that the forward integral is predestined to model financial markets
in continuous time when allowing trading strategies to depend on a more
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general information structure. It also follows from the latter equation, that
in case that W remains a semi-martingale when changing the filtration, then
the forward integral coincides with the Itoˆ-integral for semi-martingales.
3. Continuous time market games with heterogeneous information
We consider a market with a finite time horizon [0, T ] and agents which are
heterogeneously informed. For simplicity we restrict the number of agents
to two. Our analysis however can easily be modified to model the case of
arbitrary many agents. Assets include one riskless asset, which we call bond
and denote with B(t), as well as n risky assets, which we think of stocks
and denote with Si(t). The different levels of information are modeled by
using four different filtrations consecutively throughout the remaining of this
paper. These are G1 = (G1t ) for agent number one, G
2 = (G2t ) for agent number
two, F = (Ft) the σ-algebra generated by the underlying noise process, which
we assume to be a Brownian motion W(t), and finally the filtration G = (Gt)
for the coefficients of the underlying model. We assume Ft ⊆ G
p
t ⊆ FT for
p = 1, 2 and Ft ⊆ Gt ⊆ G
1
t ∩ G
2
t for t ∈ [0, T ]. The latter relationship guarantees
that even though agents may have different level of information, they both
understand how the market works and how other agents behavior affects the
market. At the current moment we do not impose any further relationships
between G1 and G2. The agents investments are described by their individual
portfolio processes πp =
(
πip(t)
)
1≤i≤n
, where πip(t) denotes the proportion of
wealth of agent p which at time t is invested in stock i = 1, ...k, while the
remaining portion π0p(t) is assumed to be invested in the bond. We will later
model the process of selling pieces of information from one agent to the other.
In order that the selling agent is not indifferent to giving away information to
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the other agent for free, we need to assume that the agents behavior affects
asset-prices. More precisely we assume the following dynamics for assets:
dB(t) = r(t)B(t)dt, B(t) = 1,
dS(t) = diag(S(t)) {µ(t, π1(t), π2(t))dt+ σ(t)d
−
W(t)} , S(0) > 0,
(7)
with diag(S(t)) the n × n-matrix with Si(t) as diagonal elements and zeros
elsewhere. We assume that the following conditions hold for the coefficients:
1. µ(t, x, y) = (µi(t, x, y)1≤i≤n) is a G-adapted process with values in C(R
n ×
R
n,Rn), r(t) is a G-adapted and real-valued stochastic process, σ(t) =
(σij(t))1≤i,j≤n is a G-adapted and R
n×n-valued stochastic process.
2.
T∫
0
(|r(t)|+ |µ(t, x, y)|+ ‖σ(t)σ⊤(t)‖)dt <∞ a.s. for all x, y ∈ Rn
3. σ(t) is forward integrable and ca`gla`d.
The chosen dynamics (7) incorporates a supply and demand feature, in
which agents current positions influence the drift term of the asset-prices.
A similar dynamic for the case of a representative agent has been used in
Kohatsu-Higa and Sulem (2006). We denote with Xp(t, π1, π2) the discounted
wealth process corresponding to agent p given chosen investment strategies
π1 and π2. The wealth processes also depend on the initial endowments of the
agents, but for the moment we omit this from the notation. The stochastic
differential equation governing the evolution of the wealth processes is given
by
dXp(t, π1, π2) = Xp(t, π1, π2)
(
π⊤p (t)(µ(t, π1(t), π2(t))− r(t))dt+ π
⊤
p (t)σ(t)d
−
W(t)
)
,
(8)
with initial condition Xp(0) = xp. Note that this equation presents a stochas-
tic differential equation with anticipating coefficients. Nevertheless, the Itoˆ
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formula for the forward integral (see Russo and Vallois (2000) implies that 8
is satisfied by
Xp (t, π1, π2) = xp exp
(
T∫
0
((π⊤p (s) (µ(s, π1(s), π2(s))− r(s))
−1
2
π⊤p (s)σ(s)σ
⊤(s)πp(s))ds+
T∫
0
π⊤p (s)σ(s)d
−
W(s))
)
,
(9)
For technical reasons we have to impose certain restriction on our portfolio
strategies which guarantee that the solution above is well defined.
Definition 2. We call a pair of portfolio strategies (π1, π2) admissible and
write (π1, π2) ∈ A if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Xp(t, π1, π2) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
2. πp(t) is ca`gla`d and π
⊤
p (t)σ(t) is forward integrable. Moreover,
T∫
0
{
|π⊤p (t)µ(t, π1(t), π2(t))− r(t)|+ |π
⊤
p (t)σ(t)σ
⊤(t)πp(t)|
}
dt <∞
3. For any bounded ca`gla`d process π˜ s.t. π˜⊤(t)σ(t) is forward integrable
there exists γ > 0 such that the families {|M1(T, π1 + ǫπ˜, π2)|}0≤ǫ≤γ and
{|M2(T, π1, π2 + ǫπ˜)|}0≤ǫ≤γ are uniformly integrable where
Mp(t, π1, π2) := E
(
t∫
0
(µ(s, π1(s), π2(s))− r(s) + J
πp
µ (s)πp(s)
−σ(s)σ⊤(s)πp(s))ds+
t∫
0
σ(s)d−W(s)
∣∣∣∣Gpt
)
.
(10)
Here J
πp
µ (s) is the Jacobian matrix of µ with respect to πp evaluated at
time s.
We assume that our agents are risk averse and that their objective is to
maximize expected utility from discounted terminal wealth. In order to ob-
tain analytically tractable results we use logarithmic utility. Taking this into
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account, the payoffs for the agents in our market game are given by
up(π1, π2) := E(ln(X
π1,π2
p (T ))) (11)
for p = 1, 2. We note that the payoff ’s up also depend on the initial endow-
ments x1 and x2 but omit this in our notation. In this setup the optimization
objective for both agents is identical and therefore asymmetry effects concern-
ing the level of risk averseness are left out in our discussion. The asymmetry
arising in our model comes from the fact that the strategies of the individual
players rely on different information and that they may effect the market in
different ways. We consider the market to be in equilibrium if the strategy
pair (π∗1, π
∗
2) ∈ A constitutes a Nash-equilibrium, i.e.
u1(π
∗
1, π
∗
2) = sup
π1∈A1(π∗2)
E
(
ln(X
π1,π
∗
2
1 (T ))
)
u2(π
∗
1, π
∗
2) = sup
π2∈A2(π∗1)
E
(
ln(X
π∗
1
,π2
1 (T ))
)
with A1(π
∗
2) = {π1|(π1, π
∗
2) ∈ A} and A2(π
∗
1) = {π2|(π
∗
1, π2) ∈ A}. The following
theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of a
Nash-equilibrium for the market game above in terms of a martingale condi-
tion.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions stated in the preceding paragraph we
have that
1. if (π∗1, π
∗
2) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium for the market game, thenMp(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)
for t ∈ [0, T ] is a martingale with respect to the filtration Gp for p = 1, 2.
2. If (π∗1, π
∗
2) ∈ A and M(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2), t ∈ [0, T ] is a martingale with respect to
the filtration Gp and up(π1, π2) is concave with respect to πp for p = 1, 2
resp., then (π∗1, π
∗
2) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of the market game.
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Proof. 1. If (π∗1, π
∗
2) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium for the market game,
then for bounded θ1 as in Definition 2 part 3, we have
u1(π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ≥ u1(π
∗
1 + ǫθ1, π
∗
2), (12)
for all ǫ in an open neighborhood of 0. This implies that the partial
directional derivative of u1 along the direction θ1 evaluated at π
∗
1 is zero,
i.e.,
0 = d
dǫ
u1(π
∗
1 + ǫθ1, π
∗
2)|ǫ=0
= E
(
T∫
0
θ⊤1 (t)
(
µ(t, π∗1(t), π
∗
2(t))− r(t) + J
π∗
1
µ (t)π1(t)− σ(t)σ
⊤(t)π∗1(t)
)
dt
+
T∫
0
θ⊤1 (t)σ(s)d
−
W(s)
)
.
(13)
We notice that the differentiation and the integral can be interchanged
because our admissibility definition implies that {|M1(T, π
∗
1 + ǫθ1, π
∗
2)|}0≤ǫ≤γ
is uniformly integrable. Let us now consider the particular process
θ1(u) = θ(t)1(t,t+h](u), h > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where θ(t) is a bounded, R
n-
valued and G1t -measurable random variable. Thus, (13) can be written
as
0 = E
(
θ⊤(t)
(
t+h∫
t
(µ(u, π∗1(u), π
∗
2(u))− r(u) + J
π∗
1
µ (u)π1(u)
−σ(u)σ⊤(u)π1(u))du+
t+h∫
t
σ(u)d−W(u)
)) (14)
Since (14) holds for all such θ we conclude
0 = E
(
t+h∫
t
(
µ(u, π∗1(u), π
∗
2(u))− r(u) + J
π∗
1
µ (u)π1(u)− σ(u)σ
⊤(u)π1(u)
)
du
+
t+h∫
t
σ(u)d−W(u)
∣∣∣∣G1t
)
(15)
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Using the definition ofMp(t, π1, π2) we obtain:
E
(
M1(t+ h, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)−M1(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)| G
1
t
)
= 0 (16)
An analogous argumentation using u2(π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ≥ u2(π
∗
1, π
∗
2 + ǫθ2) estab-
lishes:
E
(
M2(t+ h, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)−M2(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)| G
1
t
)
= 0 (17)
From (16) and (17), we infer that Mp(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2) is a G
p-martingale for p =
1, 2.
2. Let us now assume that there exists a pair (π∗1, π
∗
2) such thatM1(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)
is a G1-martingale and M2(t, π1, π2) a G
2-martingale. Therefore (16) and
(17) hold simultaneously. Let us consider the optimization problem for
agent 1. (16) implies that (15) holds, hence (14) holds for θ(t) bounded
R
n-valued and G1 measurable. Inductively we see that (13) holds for
processes of the form
θ˜1(u) =
n−1∑
i=0
θ1(ti)1(ti,ti+1](u), 0 = t0 < t1 · · · < tn = T,
with θ1(ti) bounded, R
n-valued and G1ti-measurable random variables.
Here we use the equality
T∫
0
θ˜⊤1 (t)σ(t)d
−
W(t) =
n−1∑
i=0
ti+1∫
ti
θ⊤1 (ti)σ(u)d
−
W(u),
We obtain that (13) is true for all simple processes θ˜1(u) and a density
argument establishes that (13) holds for all processes θ1 as in Definition
2 part 3. This implies
d
dǫ
u1(π1 + ǫθ1, π2)|ǫ=0 = 0. (18)
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On the other hand, using that up(π1, π2) is concave in each πp we obtain
1
ǫ
(u1(π1 + ǫθ1, π2)− u1(π1, π2))
= 1
ǫ
(u1((1− ǫ)
π1
1−ǫ
+ ǫθ1, π2)− u1(π1, π2))
≥ 1
ǫ
((1− ǫ)u1(
π1
1−ǫ
, π2) + ǫu1(θ1, π2)− u1(π1, π2))
= 1
ǫ
(u1(
π1
1−ǫ
, π2)− u1(π1, π2)) + u1(θ1, π2)− u1(
π1
1−ǫ
, π2).
Taking the limit for ǫ→ 0, and taking into account that limǫ→0
1
ǫ
(u1(
π∗
1
1−ǫ
, π∗2)−
u1(π
∗
1, π
∗
2)) = 0, as the latter is basically the directional derivative of u1
along π∗1, which by (18) must be zero, we obtain that 0 ≥ u1(θ1, π
∗
2) −
u1(π
∗
1, π
∗
2). As θ1 can be chosen within the set A1(π
∗
2) we obtain by for-
mally setting θ1 = π1 that
u1(π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ≥ u1(π1, π
∗
2) for all π1 ∈ A1(π
∗
2). (19)
Analogously we obtain
u2(π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ≥ u2(π
∗
1, π2) for all π2 ∈ A2(π
∗
1). (20)
This means (π∗1, π
∗
2) is a Nash-equilibrium for the market game.
In the following we discuss how we can use the criterion presented in
Theorem 1 in order to identify Nash-equilibria for our market game with
heterogeneous information.
Lemma 1. Assume that (π∗1, π
∗
2) is a Nash-equilibrium for our market game.
Then the process ǫ 7→ E
(∫ t+ǫ
t
σ(u)d−W(u)|Gpt
)
has absolutely continuous paths
for p = 1, 2 and the derivative
Ip(t) :=
d
dǫ
E


t+ǫ∫
t
σ(u)d−W(u)
∣∣∣∣∣∣G
p
t

 (21)
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exist a.s. for p = 1, 2. Furthermore the following equation holds for p = 1, 2
E
(
µ(t, π∗1(t), π
∗
2(t))− r(t) + J
π∗p
µ (t)πp(t)− σ(t)σ
⊤(t)πp(t)
∣∣∣Gpt
)
+ Ip(t) = 0. (22)
Under the concavity assumption for the utilities in Theorem 1 part 2 condition
(22) is a sufficient condition for a pair (π∗1, π
∗
2) ∈ A to constitute a Nash-
equilibrium.
Proof. These statements follow from equation (15) when dividing the latter
by h and taking the limit for h→ 0, Theorem 1 and Definition 2.
For the choice of µ, various specifications appear to be reasonable. However
to obtain a tractable dynamics and analytical results we focus on the linear
form
µ(t, π1, π2) = µ(t) + a(t)π1 + b(t)π2
For the general case the latter should be considered as a first order approx-
imation. In order to satisfy condition 1 on page 13 we need to assume that
the processes µ(t),a(t),b(t) are G-adapted. In order to apply the second part
of Theorem 1 it is important to note that under our assumptions a sufficient
criterion for concavity of up(π1, π2) is the following:
Assumption 1.
(
a(t) + a⊤(t)
)
− σ(t)σ⊤(t) and
(
b(t) + b⊤(t)
)
− σσ⊤(t) take val-
ues in the set of negative definite matrices
The latter assumption can be interpreted in a way that the influences of
both agents’s portfolio strategies on expected returns are embedded in the
noise. Otherwise, the agents may drive the stock prices arbitrarily high
just by buying and selling large volumes to obtain a high return. Obviously
embedded does not mean without effect. We will assume from now on that
Assumption 1 is satisfied. For notational reasons let us define the matrix
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valued function
Σ : Mn×n → Mn×n
y 7→ σσ⊤ − 2y.
Using this specification we obtain the following characterization of a Nash-
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If the following system of equations
π∗1(t) = Σ
−1(a(t))
[
µ(t)− r(t) + I1(t) + b(t)E (π
∗
2(t)| G
1
t
)]
π∗2(t) = Σ
−1(b(t))
[
µ(t)− r(t) + I2(t) + a(t)E (π
∗
1(t)| G
2
t
)]
admits a solution (π∗1, π
∗
2) ∈ A then (π
∗
1, π
∗
2) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of
our market game.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1, noticing that Jπ1µ = a(t), J
π2
µ =
b(t) and that all coefficients are measurable with respect to Gpt , p = 1, 2.
To better understand how the equilibrium strategies are constructed, we
study how they change, while changing the complexity of the model, starting
with the standard Black-Scholes model, in which we have standard informa-
tion and no market impact, i.e. Gpt = Ft for t ∈ [0, T ] and a(t) = b(t) = 0.
In this case I1(t) = I2(t) = 0 as the expectation of an Ito-integral is always
zero and therefore the equilibrium strategies are just the Merton rule. If we
allow for market impact but no non-standard information, we will still have
that I1(t) = I2(t) = 0, however the equilibrium strategies now adjust for the
actions of the opponent. In this case agents have complete information about
the opponents strategies and the Nash-equilibrium is given by
π∗1(t) = Σ
−1(a(t)) [µ(t)− r(t) + b(t)π∗2(t)]
π∗2(t) = Σ
−1(a(t)) [µ(t)− r(t) + a(t)π∗1(t)] .
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Now, in the presence of nonstandard, possibly asymmetric information two
things occur. First, the agents are no longer able to fully reflect on their
opponents strategy and instead have to take expectations based on their
current level of information. This accounts to taking conditional expectations
in Proposition 2. Furthermore the additional terms Ip(t) occur. These can
be interpreted as information drifts and adjust the strategy for a differently
perceived growth rate of the underlying asset.
The particular form of the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 2 is implicit
and has been chosen in order to understand how agents react and adjust for
their opponents strategies. Substituting the formula for π∗2(t) into the formula
for π∗1(t) and vice versa it is possible to obtain an explicit form. Note that in
order to obtain explicit formulas for the strategies it is only necessary to give
explicit formulas for the conditional expectations on the right hand side of the
expressions in Proposition 2. Such expressions are derived in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that (π∗1, π
∗
2) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of our
market game. Then the conditional expectations E (π∗1(t)| G
2
t ) and E (π
∗
2(t)| G
1
t )
in Proposition 2 are explicitly given by the following formulas
E
(
π∗1(t)| G
2
t
)
=
(
1− Σ−1(a(t))b(t)Σ−1(b(t))a(t)
)−1 {
Σ−1(a(t))(µ(t)− r(t) + I˜1(t))+
Σ−1(a(t))b(t)Σ−1(b(t))(µ(t)− r(t) + I˜2(t))
}
E
(
π∗2(t)| G
1
t
)
=
(
1− Σ−1(b(t))a(t)Σ−1(a(t))b(t)
)−1 {
Σ−1(b(t))(µ(t)− r(t) + I˜2(t))+
Σ−1(b(t))a(t)Σ−1(a(t))(µ(t)− r(t) + I˜1(t))
}
where I˜1(t) = E (I1(t)| G
2
t ) and I˜2(t) = E (I2(t)| G
1
t ) denote the information drift
of the individual agents as perceived by the opposite agent.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 2 by substituting the equation for π∗2(t)
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into the equation for π∗1(t) and vice versa and then take conditional expecta-
tions on G1t resp. G
2
t .
For the case of nonstandard homogeneous information we obtain the fol-
lowing Corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that both agents have the same level of information, i.e.
G1 = G2. If the following system of equations
π∗1(t) = Σ
−1(a(t)) (µ(t)− r(t) + I(t) + b(t)π∗2(t))
π∗2(t) = Σ
−1(b(t)) (µ(t)− r(t) + I(t) + a(t)π∗1(t))
with I(t) = I1(t) = I2(t) admits a solution (π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ∈ A then (π
∗
1, π
∗
2) constitutes
a Nash-equilibrium for the corresponding market game.
Proof. Symmetry of information implies that the the conditional expecta-
tion in Proposition 2 can be replaced by the actual strategies. Furthermore
from the definition it is clear that I1(t) = I2(t).
In the case above explicit solutions can be obtained simply by substituting
the expression for π∗2 resp. π
∗
1 into π
∗
1 resp. π
∗
2 and solving out. Let us now
assume that the agents do not only have the same level of information, but
also that the market impact of both agents is the same. This relates to
choosing a(t) = b(t). In this case we are particularly interested in symmetric
Nash-equilibria.
Corollary 2. Under symmetric information and same market impact factors
a(t) = b(t) a symmetric Nash-equilibrium (π∗, π∗) of our market game is given
by
π∗(t) =
(
1− Σ−1(a(t))a(t)
)−1
· Σ−1(a(t))(µ(t)− r(t) + I(t))
Proof. This follows by straightforward computation from Corollary 1.
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In the following we study the welfare implications of information in our
market game. By welfare implications we mainly mean, whether the market
is better of with more information or not. Doing an analysis starting with
a representative agent model such as in the classical literature Karatzas
and Pikovsky (1996), Corcuera (2004), Imkeller (2003), Leon et al. (2003) and
Ewald (2005) the answer to this question is trivial : Yes! In our framework
the analysis however is different, in the way that given more information the
agents may be able to outperform and in fact harm each other, with more
severe consequences. We will derive explicit conditions on the model param-
eters which determine whether general welfare is improved or worsened by
adding more information. In order to proceed with this we need the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that a Nash-equilibrium for our market game exists. Then∫ t
0
σ(s)d−W(s) is a Gp semi-martingale for p = 1, 2. Furthermore, if addition-
ally, the matrix valued process σ(s) is invertible a.s. then W is a Gp-semi-
martingale.
Proof. Under our assumption that the process σ(s) is G-adapted we obtain
that the forward integral
∫ t
0
σ(s)d−W(s) is Gpt -adapted. From equation (10) we
obtain
t∫
0
σ(s)d−W(s) = Mp(t, π1, π2)− E


t∫
0
(µ(s) + a(s)π1(s) + b(s)π2(s)) (23)
−r(s) + a(s)πp(s)− σ(s)σ
⊤(s)πp(s))ds
∣∣Gpt ) (24)
By separating the positive and negative parts of the integrands in the con-
ditional expectation, the latter can clearly be written as the difference of
two non-decreasing Gp-adapted processes. On the other side it follows from
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Proposition 1 and (10) thatMp(t, π1, π2) is a continuous martingale. According
to Definition 3.1. in Karatzas-Schreve (1988)
t∫
0
σ(s)d−W(s) is therefore a
continuous semi martingale.
For the following discussion we assume G = F . Let us consider a filtra-
tion H = (Ht) s.t Gt ⊂ Ht for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Denote Nash-equilibria of our
market game corresponding to the setup G1 = G = G2 with (πˆ∗1, πˆ
∗
2) and Nash-
equilibria corresponding to the setup G1 = H = G2 with (π∗1, π
∗
2).
Definition 3. The information H = (Ht) is welfare increasing, if the payoffs
from (π∗1, π
∗
2) Pareto-dominate the payoffs from (πˆ
∗
1, πˆ
∗
2). H is called welfare
decreasing if the opposite is the case. Furthermore we define the information
welfare impact of H as the vector
iwi(H) =

 u1(π∗1, π∗2)− u1(πˆ∗1, πˆ∗2)
u2(π
∗
1, π
∗
2)− u2(πˆ
∗
1, πˆ
∗
2)

 .
Clearly the information welfare impact does not depend on the initial wealth
and information is welfare increasing if both components are positive and
welfare decreasing if both components are negative. We have the following
proposition, which provides necessary and sufficient conditions depending on
the various parameters of the game, whether or not information is welfare
increasing.
Proposition 4. Writing W(t) = Wˆ(t) −
∫ t
0
α(s)ds according to Lemma 2 with
Wˆ(t) an H-Brownian motion and using the notation
Σ1 = Σ(a(t))− b(t)Σ(b(t))
−1Σ(a(t))
Σ2 = Σ((t))− b(t)Σ(b(t))
−1Σ(a(t))
the two components of the information welfare impact of H are explicitly given
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as
iwi(H)1 = E
(
T∫
0
(Σ−11 σ(t)α(t))
⊤aΣ−11 σ(t)α(t) + (Σ
−1
1 σ(t)α(t))
⊤bΣ−12 σ(t)α(t)
−1
2
(Σ−11 σ(t)α(t))
⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤Σ−11 σ(t)α(t) + (Σ
−1
1 σ(t)α(t))
⊤σ⊤(t)α(t)dt
)
iwi(H)2 = E
(
T∫
0
(Σ−12 σ(t)α(t))
⊤aΣ−11 σ(t)α(t) + (Σ
−1
2 σ(t)α(t))
⊤bΣ−12 σ(t)α(t)
−1
2
(Σ−12 σ(t)α(t))
⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤Σ−12 σ(t)α(t) + (Σ
−1
2 σ(t)α(t))
⊤σ⊤(t)α(t)dt
)
Proof. Using Corollary 1 we can easily derive the following two equations
for the equilibrium strategy (π∗1, π
∗
2) under information H:
π∗1 = Σ
−1
1 (µ(t)− r(t)) + Σ
−1
1 I(t),
π∗2 = Σ
−1
2 (µ(t)− r(t)) + Σ
−1
2 I(t)
The equilibrium strategies without additional information are given by the
market impact adjusted Merton-rules:
πˆ∗1 = Σ
−1
1 (µ(t)− r(t))
πˆ∗2 = Σ
−1
2 (µ(t)− r(t)).
Substitution of these strategies in the utility function leads to the following
expression for the first component of iwi(H)
E
(
T∫
0
Σ−11 (µ(t)− r(t))(a(t)Σ
−1
1 I(t) + b(t)Σ
−1
2 I(t)) + (Σ
−1
1 I(t))
⊤(µ(t)− r(t))
+(Σ−11 I(t))
⊤(aΣ−11 (µ(t)− r(t)) + aΣ
−1
1 I) + (Σ
−1
1 I)(bΣ
−1
2 (µ(t)− r(t)) + bΣ
−1
2 I)
−1
2
(Σ−11 I)
⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤Σ−11 I −
1
2
(Σ−11 I)
⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤Σ−11 I
−1
2
(Σ−11 I)
⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤(Σ−11 (µ(t)− r(t)))
⊤dt +
T∫
0
(Σ−11 I)d
−
W(t)
)
A similar expression can be derived for the second component. Under our
assumptions it follows from Lemma 2 and Biagini and Oksendal (2005), page
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(178) that
E


t∫
0
g(a(s), b(s), µ(s)− r(s))I(s)ds

 = 0, (25)
for any bounded function g. Using this relationship it can be verified that the
long expression above simplifies to
E
(
T∫
0
(Σ−11 σ(t)α(t))
⊤aΣ−11 σ(t)α(t) + (Σ
−1
1 σ(t)α(t))
⊤bΣ−12 σ(t)α(t)
−1
2
(Σ−11 σ(t)α(t))
⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤Σ−11 σ(t)α(t) + (Σ
−1
1 σ(t)α(t))
⊤σ⊤(t)α(t)dt
)
The analysis of the second component is completely analogous.
The expressions for the information wellfare impact are quite lengthy. For
the one dimensional case we are able to derive the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Under the assumptions that there is only one stock at the market
and the market parameters are given as µ(t) ≡ µ, a(t) ≡ a and b(t) ≡ b with
constants µ, a, b ∈ R and Σmin := min {Σ1,Σ2} > 0 the information H = (Ht) is
wellfare increasing if
1 +
a
Σ1
+
b
Σ2
≥
σ2
2Σmin
and welfare decreasing if
1 +
a
Σ1
+
b
Σ2
≤
σ2
2Σmax
with Σmax := max {Σ1,Σ2}.
Proof. Under the assumptions in the corollary it is easy to verify that the
components of the information wellfare impact vector in Proposition 4 sim-
plify to
iwi(H) =


1
Σ1
( a
Σ1
+ b
Σ2
+ 1− σ
2
2Σ1
)E
(
t∫
0
α2(t)dt
)
1
Σ2
( a
Σ1
+ b
Σ2
+ 1− σ
2
2Σ2
)E
(
t∫
0
α2(t)dt
)


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The information is welfare increasing if both components of this vector are
positive and welfare decreasing if both components are negative. Obviously
we have that E
(
t∫
0
α2(t)dt
)
≥ 0. The condition for positivity resp. negativity
is therefore exactly the one stated in the corollary.
The corollary above specifies a certain region of the parameter space con-
sisting of feasible parameters (a, b, σ2) in which information is wellfare in-
creasing. The following figure shows this region for the the example of ini-
tially enlarged filtration.
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FIGURE 1: welfare increasing region
Note that some of the points in the welfare increasing region may not sat-
isfy the concavity condition, which in this case would correspond to 2max{a, b} ≤
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σ2. However the concavity condition is not necessary for the existence of
Nash-equilibria, which in our definition of welfare increasing is implicitly
assumed. It is worth to mention though, that in general the intersection
between those points in the welfare increasing region and those points which
satisfy the concavity condition is not empty.
In order to demonstrate how our results apply to the classical case of enlarged
initial filtration we include the following example.
Example 2. Let us study the implications of the various statements above
for the case of initially enlarged filtration.
1. Consider for T0 > T the initially enlarged filtrations G
p = (Gpt ) with
Gpt = Ft∨σ(Wνp1 (T0))∨. . .∨σ(Wν
p
kp
(T0)) for t ∈ [0, T ]where
{
ν
p
1 , . . . , ν
p
kp
}
for
p = 1, 2 are subsets of {1, . . . , n}. Denote the intersection {ν11 , . . . , ν
1
k1
} ∩
{ν21 , . . . , ν
2
k2
} with {ν1, . . . , νt}. This set may possibly be empty. We have
that
Ip(t) =
d
dǫ
E
(
t+ǫ∫
t
σ(u)d−W(u)
∣∣∣∣Gpt
)
|ǫ=0
= d
dǫ
E
(
t+ǫ∫
t
σ(u)dW˜(u) +
t+ǫ∫
t
σ(u)W(T0)−W(u)
T0−u
du
∣∣∣∣Gpt
)
|ǫ=0
= σ(t)αp(t).
with
α
p
i (t) =


Wi(T0)−Wi(t)
T0−t
, i ∈ {ν11 , . . . , ν
p
kp
}
0, else
This implies that I˜1(t) = E(I1(t)|G2(t)) = σ(t)α(t) = E(I2(t)|G1(t)) = I˜2(t)
with
αi(t) =


Wi(T0)−Wi(t)
T0−t
, i ∈ {ν1, . . . , νt}
0, i 6∈ {s1, . . . , st}
.
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Substitution of these expressions into the corresponding expressions
from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 leads to analytical formulas for
the Nash-equilibrium. If the additional information is strictly comple-
mentary, i.e. {ν11 , . . . , ν
1
k1
} ∩ {ν21 , . . . , ν
2
k2
} = ∅ we find that α = 0 and
the equilibrium strategies simplify slightly. Such a case is particularly
interesting to study from the point of view of cooperative game theory.
2. Consider the case where G2 = F and G1 is given as the initially enlarged
filtration, i.e. G1t = Ft ∨ σ(W1(T0)) ∨ · · · ∨ σ(Wn(T0)) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
T0 > T . This distribution of information leads to the following Nash-
equilibria
π∗1(t) = Σ(a(t))
−1
(
µ(t)− r(t) + b(t)π∗2 + σ(t)
W(T0)−W(t)
T0−t
)
π∗2(t) = Λ
−1(µ(t)− r(t)) + Λ−1a(t)Σ(a(t))−1(µ(t)− r(t))
where Λ = Σ(b(t)) − a(t)Σ(a(t))−1b(t). In the case that agent 1 is small
and does not have any market impact, i.e. a(t) = 0, the latter Nash-
equilibrium simplifies to
π∗1(t) = Σ
−1
(
µ(t)− r(t) + b(t)π∗2 + σ(t)
W(T0)−W(t)
T0 − t
)
π∗2(t) = Σ
−1(µ(t)− r(t))
3. Assuming symmetric information and initially enlarged filtrations G1 =
G2 = H with Ht := Ft ∨ σ(W1(T0)) ∨ · · · ∨ σ(Wn(T0)), T0 ≥ T as well
as symmetric market impact a(t) = b(t) we obtain from the discussion
above and Corollary 4 that a symmetric Nash-equilibrium is given by
π∗1(t) = Σ
−1(a(t))
(
µ(t)− r(t) + σ(t)
W(T0)−W(t)
T0 − t
+ b(t)π∗2(t)
)
π∗2(t) = Σ
−1(b(t))
(
µ(t)− r(t) + σ(t)
W(T0)−W(t)
T0 − t
+ a(t)π∗1(t)
)
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As indicated before, in this case an explicit solution can be obtained by
substitution of the second strategy in the first one and vice versa and
solving out.
4. Trading of information
In the preceding section we studied how different levels of information
affect the equilibrium of the market. While it was assumed that agents have
different levels of information, they were not supposed to exchange and share
their private information. In this section we will extend our market model
in the way that agents are allowed to sell there own private information to
their opponent and/or buy the private information of their opponent. For
this reason we extend our original game, which represents a continuous time
sequential game, by two additional stages, which occur before agents invest
into the market. For matters of simplicity we only treat the case where one of
the agents, say agent 1, is better informed than the other agent, i.e. G2t ⊂ G
1
t
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In the first stage agent one announces a price P for which
he would be willing to sell the information G1 to his opponent. In the second
stage agent 2 decides whether to buy or not to buy the information offered
for the price announced by agent 1. If agent 2 decides to buy information
he faces two consequences. First his initial wealth is lowered by the amount
he has to pay for the information. Second in order to trade on the market
and choose a portfolio, agent 2 can now make use of the increased level of
information, which is then represented by the information flow G1 rather
than G2 . From the perspective of agent 1 the situation looks as follows: If
he sells the information, his initial wealth will be raised by the amount he
charges for this information, but he faces as a consequence, that his opponent
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is now able to use the increased level of information to decide on his individual
investment strategy. In a model where agents behavior does not influence
asset-prices, the latter would not really lead to consequences and agent 1
would be willing to give away information for free. However, in a model where
prices are not determined exogenously, the seller of information has to fear,
that the buyer of information may use this information in a way that affects
asset-prices to his disadvantage. Summarizing, there are two factors which
have to be taken into account in our extendedmarket game when determining
the equilibrium and the equilibrium price for the information.
1. buying information for price P lowers initial wealth from x to x− P but
provides the buyer with increased level of information, which he may
use to improve his investment strategy and obtaining a higher expected
return
2. selling information for price P increases initial wealth from x to x +
P but the agent has to face possible consequences on his own optimal
investment strategy and expected return due to the increased level of
information of his opponent
Both agents have to weigh up the benefits and losses in order to make up
their decisions. In this article we assume that agents behave non-cooperatively.
Alternatively, agents may be willing to share their information at the begin-
ning, setup a mutual investment fund and then share the profits at the end.
The main question, how to distribute the profits at the end, is studied by
means of cooperative game theory and the Nash-bargaining approach in our
working paper Ewald-Yajun (2007).
Definition 4. A price P ∗ is called an equilibrium price for the information
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H = (Ht), if the sequential game described above with the choice of G
1 = H
has a Nash-equilibrium of the type
({P ∗, π∗1} , {”buy only if price ≤ P
∗”, π∗2})
The definition above guarantees that if the information is offered at the
equilibrium price it will indeed be traded at that price. In the following
we compute equilibrium prices for the case that agent 1 is better informed
but doesn’t necessarily have the same market impact. This is the typical
setup when a consulting company sells their information and expertise to a
client which presents a major market maker. Criteria one and two above
still apply for this setup. In order to solve our extended market game we
apply backward induction. In the previous section we studied the third stage
and have identified equilibrium strategies for general levels of information.
We found that the equilibrium strategies do not depend on initial wealth.
This feature depends on our choice of utility function as the logarithm, but
is also observed with other utility functions such as exponential utility. Note
however that even though the equilibrium strategies are unaffected by the
initial wealth, the amount of utility obtained from following these strategies
does. Using this fact we find that in the last stage two scenarios are possible.
Scenario one occurs, if information is traded within the first two stages. In
this case both players have the same level of information G1 in the last sage.
We denote the equilibrium strategies for the corresponding sub-game starting
in stage 3 with (π∗1, π
∗
2). If information is not traded within the first two
periods, then agents posses asymmetric information in the third stage. In this
case we denote the equilibrium for the corresponding sub-game with (πˆ∗1, πˆ
∗
2).
These equilibria can be computed with the methods presented in the previous
section.
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Proposition 5. Let P ∗ be a solution of the following system
ux2−P
∗
2 (π
∗
1, π
∗
2) = u
x2
2 (πˆ
∗
1, πˆ
∗
2)
ux1+P
∗
1 (π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ≥ u
x1
1 (πˆ
∗
1, πˆ
∗
2).
Here the upper indices at the utilities denote the agents initial endowment.
Then P ∗ is an equilibrium price for the information G1 in the extended market
game illustrated above. In particular an equilibrium price is unique.
Proof. This follows mainly from the discussion above and the definition of
an equilibrium price. As maximal expected utility depends monotonically
increasing on initial wealth and the price P ∗ of the information is added to
agents 1 initial wealth x1, agent 1 is trying to set the price as high a possible.
Agent 2 has to wager whether to buy or not to buy the information for this
price. Obtaining more information raises his maximum expected utility, but
the price of the information P ∗ is subtracted from his initial wealth. The first
equality in Proposition 5 sets the price in a way that agent 2 is indifferent
about buying or not buying. Even though agent 2 would be willing to buy
for a price which satisfies the first equality, it is not a priori clear that agent
1 would sell for this price, as he has to wager the consequence of having
an opponent on the market which is better informed than original, against
the immediate prospect of more initial wealth. This decision is reflected
by the inequality in Proposition 5. Using these arguments it then follows
from backward induction that ({P ∗, π∗1} , { ”buy only if price ≤ P
∗”, π∗2}) is a
sequential Nash-equilibrium and therefore that P ∗ is an equilibrium price.
Definition 5. The price P ∗ is called a feasible price if
ux2−P
∗
2 (π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ≥ u
x2
2 (πˆ
∗
1, πˆ
∗
2)
ux1+P
∗
1 (π
∗
1, π
∗
2) ≥ u
x1
1 (πˆ
∗
1, πˆ
∗
2).
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By Definition an equilibrium price is feasible. Feasibility of a price ensures
that information is traded under this price, however the selling agent may
perform suboptimal. In the presence of many information providers, feasible
prices other than the equilibrium price may occur. It is straightforward to
verify that the two inequalities in Definition 5 are equivalent to the following
two inequalities
P ∗ ≥ x1 exp

E


T∫
0
[π∗1(t)(µ(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)− r(t))− πˆ
∗
1(t)(µ(t, πˆ
∗
1, πˆ
∗
2)− r(t))
−
1
2
((π∗1(t))
2 − (πˆ∗1(t))
2)σ2(t)
]
dt+
T∫
0
(π∗1(t)− πˆ
∗
1(t))σ(t)d
−
W(t)



− x1
P ∗ ≤ x2 exp

E


T∫
0
[π∗2(t)(µ(t, π
∗
1, π
∗
2)− r(t))− πˆ
∗
2(t)(µ(t, πˆ
∗
1, πˆ2
∗)− r(t))
−
1
2
((π∗2(t))
2 − (πˆ∗2(t))
2)σ2(t)
]
dt+
T∫
0
(π∗2(t)− πˆ
∗
2(t))σ(t)d
−
W(t)



− x2.
Note that one can evaluate the contribution of the forward integral by means
of formula (4)
E


T∫
0
(π∗1(t)− πˆ
∗
1)σ(t)d
−
W(t)

 = E


T∫
0
Dt+((π
∗
1(t)− πˆ
∗
1(t))σ(t))dt

 ,
For an equilibrium price the second inequality has to be satisfied as an equal-
ity. The computation of the price of the information in general can now be
done along the following lines. Use the formulas for the equilibrium strate-
gies from the previous sections, substitute these in the formulas above, solve
the second formula for P ∗ and see whether the solution verifies the first
inequality. If this is the case P ∗ is the equilibrium price for the information
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specified. In the following we consider the case of initially enlarged filtration.
More precisely we consider the case of a single stock and choose G1t = Ft ∨
σ(WT0) for T0 > T and G
2
t = Ft for t ∈ [0, T ]. It follows from Example 2 parts 2
and 3 that
π∗1(t) =
σ2(t)−b(t)
σ4(t)−2(a(t)+b(t))σ2(t)+3a(t)b(t)
[
µ(t)− r(r) + σ(t)
WT0
−Wt
T0−t
]
,
π∗2(t) =
σ2(t)−a(t)
σ4(t)−2(a(t)+b(t))σ2(t)+3a(t)b(t)
[
(µ(t)− r(r) + σ(t)
WT0
−Wt
T0−t
]
,
πˆ∗1(t) =
σ2(t)−b(t)
σ4(t)−2(a(t)+b(t))σ2(t)+3a(t)b(t)
[µ(t)− r(r)] + σ(t)
σ2(t)−2a(t)
WT0
−Wt
T0−t
,
πˆ∗2(t) =
σ2(t)−a(t)
σ4(t)−2(a(t)+b(t))σ2(t)+3a(t)b(t)
[µ(t)− r(r)] .
(26)
Substituting these strategies into the inequalities above, while using that for
any bounded and measurable function f
E
(
T∫
0
f(µ(t), r(t), σ(t))
WT0
−Wt
T0−t
dt
)
= E
T∫
0
f(µ(t), r(t), σ(t))dW˜(t)− E
(
T∫
0
f(µ(t), r(t), σ(t))dW(t)
)
= 0
we obtain
P ∗ ≥ x1 exp
{
E(
T∫
0
((a(t)(σ
2(t)−b(t)
k
)2 + b(t) (σ
2(t)−a(t))(σ2(t)−b(t))
k2
− a(t)
(σ2(t)−2a(t))2
)
−1
2
((σ
2(t)−b(t)
k
)2 − ( 1
σ2(t)−2a(t)
)2) + (σ
2(t)−b(t)
k
− 1
σ2(t)−2a(t)
))σ2(t)(
WT0
−Wt
T0−t
)2dt)
}
−x1
P ∗ ≤ x2 exp
{
E(
T∫
0
((a(t) σ
2(t)−b(t)
σ2(t)−a(t)
+ b(t)− σ
2(t)
2
) (σ
2(t)−a(t))2
k2
+σ
2(t)−a(t)
k
)σ2(t)(
WT0
−Wt
T0−t
)2dt)
}
− x2.
(27)
Depending on the complexity of the model, the values on the right hand
side of the equalities can either be computed in closed form, using numerical
methods or Monte-Carlo valuation. The following figures present cases for
which we computed feasible price areas under the assumptions above. The
equilibrium prices are represented by the upper border of the feasible price
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areas. The ask price represents the minimum price for which the informed
agent would be willing to sell the information, the offer price is the maximum
price the uninformed agent would be willing to pay for the information. The
feasible price region is indicated with dots. We see that for the case where the
non-informed agent has no market impact, the informed agent would actually
be willing to give the information away for free.
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FIGURE 2: feasible price area
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As one can see on figures 2-4, the volatility parameter σ2 plays an interest-
ing role. It can either increase or decrease the size of the range of feasible
prices.
5. Conclusion
We have studied a continuous time financial market game in which agents
possess different levels of information within an anticipative stochastic cal-
culus framework. Technically our game represents an anticipative stochastic
differential game. To the best of our knowledge such games have not been
studied before. We derived necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex-
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FIGURE 4: feasible price area
istence of Nash-equilibria in this game and studied the impact the level of
information has on the Nash-equilibria and on general wellfare. In the second
part we extended the game with two pre-stages in which information can be
traded among the agents. The question of pricing information has so far only
been studied in a representative agent framework. We introduced the notion
of an equilibrium price for specified information and derive a certain set of
inequalities which characterize it. Various examples for the case of initially
enlarged filtration are given.
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